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EDITORIAL
The supreme court, in its recent de
cision in the case of the United Railways
& Electric Company of Baltimore,
handed down as we go to press, has
accepted a logical corollary to its former decisions. It has long
been clear that in determining whether or not a given rate struc
ture is confiscatory the test is to compare the probable yield
thereunder with the aggregate of three things:

Compensation for
Exhaustion Based
on Present Value

(1) The amounts necessarily expended for supplies consumed,
wages and salaries paid and expenses incurred in
rendering the service;
(2) Compensation for the partial exhaustion of the property
used in rendering service;
(3) A return at a reasonable rate on the value of the property
necessarily employed in rendering the service.
In previous cases the court had held consistently that the third
element must be computed upon the present values of the prop
erty, and it is entirely logical that it should now apply the same
ruling to the second element in the computation. Any doubts as
to the soundness of this decision must be based on practical
considerations. The difficulties inherent in such a method of
determination are dwelt upon by Mr. Justice Brandeis in a long
dissenting opinion. To the accountant, much of this opinion
will probably seem persuasive, though it is lengthened and
weakened by references to industrial practices which seem irrele
vant to the present discussion. Industrial precedents are not
valid, because cost is the foundation of industrial accounting
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just as surely as present value has become the basis of rate
regulation through the decisions of the court.
Viewed from the professional stand
point, the decision unfortunately seems
to imply a further enhancement of the
importance of the engineer and a corresponding diminution of the
part to be played by the accountant. The question whether
rates are or are not confiscatory will become more and more an
engineering question. Up to the present, the practical applica
tion of the test above-mentioned has been based mainly on cost
of reproduction, which is comparatively easy of ascertainment;
but the next logical step would seem to be to base the determina
tion on a consideration of the cost and the rate of exhaustion of
an ideal plant capable of rendering the same service. If the
value of the property employed or exhausted is to be the test,
that value is no greater because the plant rendering the service
is expensive and subject to rapid depreciation than it would be
if the same service were being rendered by a different type of
plant, cheaper to construct and subject to less depreciation. If
this view is correct, the determinations of the courts in future
cases may become more and more speculative and the practical
outcome depend largely on the skill of the professional ad
visors to the two sides of the controversy. Our engineering
friends are to be congratulated on the prospect thus opening
up and we have no doubt the utilities, with their aid, will
fare well in the courts. For the present, and until the price
curve turns downward or new inventions render existing plants
obsolete, the public may expect to bear not only the cost of higher
compensation to the utilities but the higher cost of securing that
compensation.
Decision Favors
the Engineer

Of course, there is another side of the
picture. The courts have always in
sisted that rates must be reasonable and
may not be increased, even if they are not fully compensatory,
if an increase would make them unreasonable. While this
limitation is itself difficult of enforcement, the American public
by and large gets its service from the utilities at reasonable prices.
Perhaps, therefore, there will be no general complaint if a part
of the skill and resourcefulness which is constantly being devoted
82
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to reducing the cost of operation is diverted to the task of increas
ing the limit of gross revenues. Furthermore a meed of praise
should be accorded to those who presented to the court in the
Baltimore case a record which forced the court to the conclusion
that a return of 6.26 per cent certainly was not, and a return of
7.44 might not be, sufficient to attract capital into the street
railway field.

There is no question at present before
the accountant which excites keener
interest than the recipient’s treatment
of stock dividends, and this condition will continue while there is
the least uncertainty as to the proper classification of such distri
butions—or perhaps until the current practice of giving stock
holders more stock is superseded by some other plan as yet un
known. The Journal of Accountancy has expressed the belief
that the decisions of the courts in certain cases involving income
taxation have clearly shown that a stock dividend is not income
while it remains a stock dividend. The well-known argument
that increasing the number of pieces of paper indicating owner
ship in an asset or group of assets does not increase the value of
the owner’s holdings seems to us quite sound in almost all cases.
There are instances wherein the distribution of a stock dividend
does not flatten the price of the stock and the new shares have an
immediate value in and of themselves without taking anything
from the value of the older shares. But even in such circum
stances we can not bring ourselves to the belief that a stock
dividend is really income until it has been converted into cash.
Furthermore, as one correspondent asks, when the stock is sold
why should not part or all of the proceeds be treated as a
reduction of cost or book value of original holdings upon
which the stock dividend was based? Let it be admitted
for the sake of illustration that the new stock is easily salable
—as it is, for example, in the case of the North American
Company, which has been the topic of much discussion in
these pages during recent years. It does not seem to us that
the ability to realize profits is actual realization prior to sale.
If a man who owns a piece of land which he purchased for $1,000
and has held during a time of rapid advance in values, now finds
that his property can be sold whenever he desires to sell for $10,
000—he has, let us say, a firm offer of that amount—has he re83
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ceived a profit of $9,000 on his investment (omitting all question
of interest, taxes and other carrying charges) or has he merely an
opportunity to make a profit if he cares to do so? The courts
hold that there is no profit “until realized,” or, in other words,
cash is the determining factor. Comments which appeared in
The Journal of Accountancy for November, 1929, on the
general subject of stock dividends have been criticized both
favorably and adversely. Some accountants incline to the opinion
that any attempt to differentiate between stock dividends which
increase one’s wealth and those which simply alter the form of
evidence of wealth is fraught with too much difficulty and doubt
to be worth while. They prefer to cling to the dicta of the courts
that nothing is income until it becomes tangible. Other ac
countants are convinced that dividends in stock, such as those of
the North American Company, which are paid regularly in lieu
of distributions of surplus, can be taken as true income and should
be treated by the recipient precisely as he would treat cash. These
readers are not afraid to attempt to classify stock dividends as
either income or mere transformation. They would base their
decision largely upon market values; and some go so far as to say
that stock dividends may be entered in the books of the stock
holder at the market price prevailing on the day of receipt, what
ever be the state of the market—whether quotations are sane
or as unreasonably high as they were before the collapse of last
October.

From the letters received we select
the following:
“I have read with considerable in
terest the recent editorial section in The Journal of Ac
countancy relating to stock dividends. Almost immediately
thereafter came the bulletin of the American Institute of Ac
countants, dealing with the same subject. The latter naturally
deals with the subject more fully and it seemed to me that your
briefer editorial notes might lead some accountants who did not
consider all the facts of the case into an untenable position.
“I refer more particularly to your caption ‘Stock Dividends Are
Not Income in Law.’ This is surely misleading, as the case
quoted in support of this point of view was a tax case, which must
be construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer, and each decision is
only given on the facts before the court and, naturally, facts
relating to every stock dividend could not have been before the
court in the particular case decided: actually the case involved an
unusual distribution of a 50% stock dividend.
84
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“In these days when many companies have made a regular
practice of distributing a portion of their current earnings in the
form of stock dividends, in order to strengthen their cash position,
though desiring to distribute a reasonable portion of their current
earnings, it is surely optional to the recipient of such dividend
whether he sells it, and thereby converts it into a cash income
without reducing the book value of his actual original investment
in the company, or whether he increases his investment in the
company as compared with a year ago, by holding it. The latter
course would be identical with an investor in a company distribut
ing cash dividends who, not requiring the cash, invested his divi
dend in additional stock in the same company.
“It is respectfully submitted that there is not the clear-cut
distinction that there should be between a stock dividend made
as part of the regular distribution out of regular earnings, such,
for example, as the distributions of the Electric Bond & Share
Company and Sears, Roebuck & Company, and substantial stock
distributions amounting to as high as 100% or even more, where
the desire presumably is to keep the stock of the corporation in
question to reasonable limits for the average investor.
“Another angle of the discussion seems to have been entirely
overlooked, namely, the apportionment of stock dividends
received by a decedent’s estate and its distribution between life
tenant and corpus. There, of course, the situation is covered by
the state law and not the federal law and, to the writer it seems
very properly, several of the important states have laid down rules
legally to determine what portion of a stock dividend should be
paid to the life-tenant as being income indisputably. In those
states that still keep the old rule, apparently inherited from or
adopted from the English law, that stock dividends are accruals of
capital, apparently the testator, if he wishes his life-tenant to
receive the entire income of the estate or trust fund, and any of his
investments are in companies that make periodical small stock
dividends as part of their system of distribution of current earn
ings, should insert a special clause in his will to deal with the
matter.
“Whilst it is realized that your editorial in particular seems to
have in mind principally the numerous investment trust corpora
tions, to which it especially refers, it perhaps generalizes too much
not to be somewhat misleading.
“Yours truly,
“J. H. Stagg.”

These comments by Mr. Stagg are wel
When Does a Dividend
come. They express what seems to be a
Become Income?
common conception of the nature of
stock dividends. There is, however, nothing in this letter which
necessarily conflicts with the opinions published in these pages.
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The difference seems to be chiefly due to misunderstanding of the
premises. The caption to which our correspondent refers is not
misleading if it is wholly true, and that it is true is admitted.
The reasons for declaring stock dividends in place of ordinary
cash payments are not now at issue. If that were the only bone
of contention there would be perfect peace. The Journal of
Accountancy’s opinion of the stock-dividend policy of the North
American Company is evident in the editorial notes which ap
peared in May, 1928. The question which is now of interest is
the treatment of stock dividends when received, not the theory
which is back of their distribution, and we cannot see the slightest
justification for taking into the books of the recipient, whether
corporate or individual, a right to profits before that right has
been exercised. Someone may say that it is splitting hairs to
accept as income the payment received for stock sold and to
reject the stock which can be sold for cash at a moment’s notice.
But the truth is that the market value of stock may change in a
moment and a right to sell not exercised may fade away as quickly
as any other intangible item. Let us suppose that there are two
stockholders, A and B, each of whom received a stock dividend
October 1, 1929. The market price of the stock on that day
was, perhaps, $100. The stockholder whom we call A felt that
his dividend would be more acceptable in the form of cash and,
accordingly, his share of stock was sold for $100. B believed that
the prospects of an advance in value made it desirable to hold his
share. On October 31st the market had gone to the devil and
the stock was then sold at, say, $10 a share. Does anyone con
tend that the two men received the same amount of income?
It may be constructive to inquire what effect would have followed
a decision by both A and B to enter their stock dividends in their
books at the market value of October 1st.

The apportionment of stock dividends
received by a decedent’s estate to life
tenant and remainderman is, as Mr.
Stagg justly points out, a matter of importance and no little
difficulty. When state statutes provide a method it is, of course,
perfectly simple to make a division, but even in such cases there
may be serious injustice, or at least interference with disposition
of the estate according to the wishes of the testator. A company,
which has never paid a dividend, may have been regarded by the
86
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testator as a remote source of profit and he may have felt that his
share in the company should go over to the corpus of the estate
after death of all life-tenants. Shortly after his own death the
company may adopt the policy of distributing stock dividends,
with consequent reduction in the value of the original stock. If
stock dividends were income in such a case the corpus of the estate
might receive practically nothing and the life-tenants practically
all—and that in direct opposition to the intentions of the testator.
Ora company, which had always paid dividends in cash, may have
been regarded by the owner as a source of immediate returns and
he may have willed his interest in it so that a life-tenant would
receive the proceeds. Then the company may have changed its
policy and stock dividends may have taken the place of cash.
If these dividends are not income and were not converted into
cash the life-tenant would not gain and the remainderman would
receive all. The whole question of the rights of legatees has
always been full of fine legal problems, and there have been com
paratively few estates in which bequests to life-tenants have been
included that have not led to a great deal of dispute. Quite
often the purpose of the testator has been entirely frustrated. It
is not astonishing, therefore, to find that the stock dividend of the
present-day vogue is confusing to the administrator of estates.
It would be unwise to expect anything else. But that does not
seem to affect the vital consideration. It does not change the
nature of a stock dividend to pay it to the estate of a decedent.
As Mr. Stagg suggests, the course of wisdom is to make specific
provisions in wills that stock dividends shall be regarded as
income or as principal. Then there should be no complications.
If no provision of that kind is in the will the life-tenant may be
unfortunate, but that will be due to circumstances over which he
can have no control. Because an administrator believes that
distributions should be made available to life-tenants is not suffi
cient reason for departing from the established principles of law.
Mr. Stagg is partly correct in assuming that the notes to which he
refers were concerned with investment trusts. They were
directly relative to all holding companies and to the stock divi
dends received by such companies from other companies. The
chief peril in the entry of stock dividends at market value on the
date of payment is the tendency to gross inflation of apparent
profits and the consequent effect upon the dividends, either cash
or stock, to be distributed by the recipient companies. Upon
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that point most accountants seem to agree. We can not for the
life of us see how a method of valuation of stock dividends which
is unsound and dangerous in the case of a corporation can become
sane and safe in the case of any other stockholder.

At a recent meeting of a state society of
accountants a speaker referred to the
custom of charging low fees for profes
sional services when the client to whom such special consideration
was accorded might be expected to call upon the accountant for
more important services in the future. The question was not
discussed at any length and there may have been wide differences
of opinion as to the propriety or impropriety of allowing the po
tential to influence the actual. The comments which were
heard seemed to be in opposition to allowing future relationship
to affect the amount of fees for past labor. The subject is one that
is elusive and not readily defined. Nearly every mortal is in
clined to let the possible effects sway him in the determination of
policy or even principle, and it is a counsel of perfection to urge
that one hew to the line, let the chips fly where they may. Now
and then arises a citizen whose indifference to the throng about
him makes him conspicuous; but most of us in our calm moments
—there are still a few calm moments in the lives of the majority—
prefer to ponder over intentions before they become facts. It is
manifestly quite wrong to base a professional fee upon the ability
of the client to produce later fees. Indeed, it savors a little of a
contingent basis for fees when the element of possible repetition
is allowed to prevail. But it is folly to ignore all save the abso
lutely righteous, and even accountants may be conceded a few
human frailties. There may be many accountants who could be
induced to charge a merely nominal fee for a casual service to a
great corporation whose appreciation might take the form of an
annual audit. So much may be admitted. That differs, how
ever, rather sharply from the utterly reprehensible practice of
charging what one might call sprat fees—bait for mackerel.
They might also be called gratitude fees, on the theory that grati
tude, as Sir Robert Walpole said long ago, is a lively sense of
future favors. We have heard of firms which have been so lost
to decency that they have offered to undertake accounting work
for a song—often out of tune—in the confident assurance that the
establishment of temporary association with a client would lead
88
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to permanent retention in a professional capacity. Generally
such magnanimous offers are addressed to clients of other ac
countants. The short-sightedness of the business man who will
accept something for nothing more tangible than prospective
emolument is not the point at present. Such a man is not to be
pitied when he finds that too often the something which he ex
pected for nothing turns out to be precisely equal in value to the
fee. One usually gets about what he pays for, and most bargains
are expensive. There is, however, record of a few cases in which
an accountant has rendered good service at a loss to attract
clients, and in such cases it is the state of the accountant rather
than the fate of the client which is of interest.
There is no law nor rule of conduct which
forbids an accountant to work without
fee. An old legend describes the strange
history of a lawyer who neglected his fees, but he lived, if the
story is true, in a far country and at a remote time. There was,
too, some reason to doubt his sanity. There is nothing written
for the guidance of the practice of law which makes imperative
the marriage of service and fee. In fact, there seems to be no
specific requirement that a fee shall be charged or collected by
any professional man; and the accountant is, therefore, within his
rights if he waives the fee. A wise client, however, will look
askance at the over-benevolent accountant and will suspect that
there may be implications not nominated in the bond. Some
clients, alas, are not wise. Some will take what they think
to be advantage of special introductory prices, as they say in the
advertisements of cosmetics. It is a grave question whether the
accountant whose fees are only partly in cash and chiefly in good
will is foolish or worse. The objections to contingent fees are
almost as potent where gratuitous services are concerned,
except, of course, when services are rendered as an act of pure
charity or public spirit. For those there can be only praise.
If an accountant’s work is worth anything at all it is worth as
much in one instance as in another, provided the service is the
same in both. It is not fair to the accountant to spend himself
without immediate reward. Every laborer in the vineyard of the
professions is worthy of his hire. It is not reasonable to expect
that a man who works for nothing except goodwill will be impartial
and judicial. A fee contingent upon the results of a case is con89
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demned principally because the very fact of contingency almost
precludes unprejudiced opinion. Only the super-man can rise
above the miasma of personal interest. When the accountant
voluntarily sacrifices his fees or sets them below compensation
he indicates instantly that his interest is primarily in the results
of his ostensible generosity to the client. Can he be expected to
exercise that cold, dispassionate judgment which is equally ready
to damn or to commend—that detached impartiality which is the
essence of the professional obligation—when what he seeks is the
friendship of the client? His insufficient fee is an incontrovertible
proof of his purpose. There is also this further thought concern
ing the expectant practitioner and his feeble fees: he may acknowl
edge that his charges are intentionally inadequate for purposes of
magnetism; but does he know that it is more difficult to rise to
fair levels from the depths than it is to start aright without pre
liminary descent? That transforms the question to one of simple
expediency, which may be more convincing than any argument
on purely ethical theses will be to these mackerel fishers.
Observant readers of The Journal of
Accountancy will detect in this issue
of the magazine several changes in form
and arrangement. To begin with, the editorial notes, which for
many years have sheltered between the contributed articles on
specific accounting subjects and the regular “departments,”
as they have been called, now come into the leading position on
the first and succeeding pages. This change is made in response
to many requests—based perhaps upon the notion that the
thorough reader can tackle them with unwearied intellect and,
having passed them by, can then refresh himself at the fountain
of purer wisdom which contributors supply. Another change,
which we effect with genuine regret, is the omission of a special
section devoted to consideration of the questions of income-tax
law and its administration. Ever since 1913, when income in
this country became a sort of partnership affair, in which the
federal government insisted on participating, we have published
narrative and analytical comments upon the tax statutes and the
incidence of taxation. Now Stephen G. Rusk, who has served
most recently as editor of the tax department, has asked to be
relieved of the responsibility, and his request has been reluctantly
granted. In view of the gradual approach to standards in the
90
Matters of
Form

Editorial

execution of tax laws and the apparently lessening interest of the
accountant in tax cases, it seems unnecessary to allot each month
a portion of the magazine to the subject. Instead we shall at
tempt to present summaries of the most important enactments or
rulings as they appear. In addition to what may be called news
of taxation, we intend to assign from time to time whatever space
may be required to a brief synopsis of really important current
events which may affect the interests of all who profess and call
themselves accountants. Much of the matter which will appear
will be summarized from full reports published in the Bulletin of the
American Institute of Accountants. The Bulletin is to continue
as before-—and in passing it may be noted that the Bulletin
evidently meets a demand for a detailed chronicle of contemporary
affairs—but the outstanding events which are recorded there and
elsewhere will be brought directly to the attention of readers of
The Journal of Accountancy. Laws relative to the certifi
cation of accountants, significant court decisions, regulations
affecting corporate procedure and similar matters will be men
tioned. Other plans for the future construction of The Journal
of Accountancy are under consideration and, if found desirable,
will be introduced. Accountancy is changing almost daily and
its spread now carries it into the fields of finance, economics,
civics, sociology and the like. It can no longer be restricted by
the old boundaries of debit and credit. The growth of profes
sional accountancy is a constant marvel to the old fellows and a
spur to the imagination of the young—sometimes too sharp a spur.
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